WILL MARKET PRICES ENHANCE CHINESE AGRICULTURE?: A TEST OF REGIONAL COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE by Zhong, Funing & Carter, Colin A.
Will Market Prices Enhance Chinese
Agriculture?: A Test of Regional
Comparative Advantage
Colin A.  Carter and Fu-Ning  Zhong
China is the world's largest producer  and consumer of food.  In the past, China's
governmental  policy advocated regional self-sufficiency  in agricultural  production, and
it is generally  believed that regional self-sufficiency was enforced  at high economic
cost. However,  this changed  with the  1979  economic reforms which encouraged some
regional specialization.  It is expected that there may be further  shifts in regional
production patterns and interregional trade flows.  This article uses data on land
productivity to test for regional comparative  advantage, and it provides  some
empirical evidence on provincial comparative advantage in cotton versus  grain
production in China.
Key  words: Chinese agriculture, comparative  advantage.
In his book entitled Getting Prices  Right: The
Scope and Limits of Agricultural Price  Policy,
Peter Timmer  stresses  the fact that there  are
high payoffs associated with allowing markets
to work  in developing countries.  His logic is
indisputable,  and  in  fact  many  developing
countries are moving in the direction of mar-
ket  deregulation.  The  People's  Republic  of
China is one prominent  example.  It accounts
for about one-fourth  of the world's poor and
over  the past decade  has experimented  with
an open-market philosophy in the agricultural
sector. In this article we hypothesize that "get-
ting prices right" will lead to increased regional
specialization  in Chinese  agriculture,  and  we
provide  some  empirical  evidence  on  how
China's  peasant  farmers  have  responded  to
greater economic  freedom.
China  is  the  third  largest  country  in  the
world, with a land area of approximately  9.6
million  square kilometers.  It has primarily  a
temperate  climate,  but  since  China  encom-
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passes  such  a large  area,  climatic  conditions
vary  across a wide spectrum.  Given the vari-
ation  in climate,  topography,  and  soils,  one
would  expect  Chinese  agriculture  to  be  ex-
tremely diverse from region to region and from
province to province.  However, this is not the
case.  There has been very  little regional  spe-
cialization  because  past Chinese  government
policy  advocated  local  self-sufficiency  in  al-
most every aspect of agricultural production.
China has a long history of self-sufficiency
in nonagricultural as well as agricultural goods
and as a country has never been trade oriented.
This was true as far back as the feudal period.
In modem China the Marxist ideology has been
used by the country's leaders to emphasize the
importance of self-reliance. International trade
was  viewed  by the Chinese  government  as a
method whereby rich countries  could exploit
poor ones. In many of his writings, Chairman
Mao Tse-tung'  stressed the point that a coun-
try's political independence is inseparable from
its  economic  independence.  As  Shu-yun Ma
succinctly  stated:
Self-reliance was the guiding principle of China's foreign
trade during Mao's era, upon which there had been no
serious discussion among Chinese economists on inter-
' Also spelled Mao Zedong.
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national trade prior to the  adoption  of the open  door
policy. (p. 292)
The situation changed  in 1979  and according
to Ma, Chinese economists  have come to ac-
cept the validity of the theory of comparative
advantage. They recognize that the original Ri-
cardian concept of  comparative advantage was
partially  based  on the  labor theory  of value
and is thus not incompatible with Marxist ide-
ology. Of course, this applies to regional trade
within the country as well as to international
trade.
It is generally believed that regional self-suf-
ficiency  in Chinese  agriculture  has been  en-
forced at a very high economic cost. However,
the 1979  economic reforms have moved Chi-
nese agriculture in the direction of encouraging
specialization  through  providing  for market-
determined  resource  allocation.  If these  re-
forms  continue,  industrial crops  will  be sub-
stituted for grain  in  those  areas  where  grain
yields have been relatively poor. It is expected
that there may be significant shifts in regional
production patterns and interprovincial  trade
flows. Increased specialization and trade in ag-
riculture  present enormous  opportunities  for
economic  gain  in  China  (Anderson;  World
Bank  1985a).  Some  knowledge  of the  com-
parative advantage of each province or region
would  be  useful  for  forecasting  overall  pro-
duction  and  trade  adjustments  and  for ana-
lyzing policy alternatives.  We use data on land
productivity  to test for regional  comparative
advantage in Chinese  agriculture  and provide
some empirical  evidence  on  provincial com-
parative advantage in cotton versus grain pro-
duction.  The specific hypothesis tested here is
that for a selected number of provinces in Chi-
na, the ratio of sown  areas of cotton to grain
is determined  by the expected  ratio of yields
and/or returns.
Theories of Comparative Advantage
Trade models are normally built to determine
which  goods  a country  (or region)  will trade
and why  (Deardorff).  The formation  of trade
flows is explained according to the law of com-
parative advantage, which states that a country
(or region) will tend to export those goods which
have the lowest relative costs (prices) in a closed
economy. Trade models such as the Ricardian
and  Heckscher-Ohlin  (H-O) then  provide  an
explanation  for differences  in "closed  econo-
my" prices.
The classical (Ricardian) theory of compar-
ative  advantage  assumes  one  factor  of pro-
duction and predicts that relative productivity
differentials  will  determine  a  country's  (re-
gion's) specialization  in production and its di-
rection of trade. It asserts that the composition
of trade  is  determined  by  international  pro-
ductivity  differentials  and this leads to differ-
ences in relative autarkic prices between coun-
tries.  According  to the theory,  a country will
specialize  in  the  production  of those  goods
which can be produced at a lower opportunity
cost relative to other countries.  A country or
region will export (import) products for which
the international  price  is higher  (lower) than
the domestic opportunity cost of producing an
additional  unit. This concept has been gener-
alized  under  the  moder  H-O  trade  model,
which  suggests that resource  endowments de-
termine  comparative  advantage.  Although
these  models  have many restrictive  assump-
tions, their basic tenet regarding the direction
of trade remains sound. These theories can be
applied to interregional trade, and in fact they
may  have  more  validity  for  trade  between
regions  within  a  country  since  many  of the
assumptions may be more realistic in that con-
text than for trade between two countries.
Specialization  in Agriculture
There  are relatively  few  studies  available  on
comparative  advantage  in agricultural  trade.
Pearson and Meyer used the domestic resource
cost approach and estimated the relative com-
parative  advantage of African  coffee growers.
They argued that a country has a comparative
advantage in exporting a commodity if the so-
cial opportunity cost of production is less than
the border price. Pearson and Meyer computed
country ratios of the opportunity  costs of do-
mestic factors used in each unit of production
to the net foreign exchange generated per unit.
They found Uganda,  Ethiopia, and  Tanzania
to have a strong comparative advantage in cof-
fee. The Ivory Coast was found to have a much
weaker competitive position in coffee produc-
tion.
A World Bank (1985b) report on China ad-
dressed  the  issue  of provincial  comparative
advantage in industrial crops. This report mea-
sured the ratio of industrial crop yields to ce-
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real  grain yields  in each  province.  The  ratio
was normalized by dividing it through by the
same ratio of  yields for the entire country. The
resulting  comparative  advantage index  (CAI)
was calculated using one year's data and it was
computed  for  seven  different  crops:  ground-
nuts, sesame, rapeseed, cotton, jute, sugar cane,
and tobacco. A cross-sectional correlation co-
efficient was  then run between  the CAIs  and
the actual sown-area percentages in each prov-
ince.  The  correlation  coefficients  were  com-
pared to similar statistics for India.  These re-
sults are shown in table  1, where it is clear the
correlation  coefficients  tend to  be higher  for
China than for India,  except for jute and to-
bacco. The World Bank, therefore,  concluded
that provincial specialization in industrial crops
according to comparative advantage was more
characteristic  of  1981  China  than  India  in
1977/78.  This was a surprising result because
there are relatively few restrictions placed  on
Indian farmers  in terms  of which  crops  they
are  able to grow.  However,  the World  Bank
used only  one year's data  and the linear cor-
relation  coefficient  estimates  may not be  ac-
curate given that for some crops there were as
few as nine observations.
In agriculture, if we are considering only crop
production,  the land productivity differential
in terms of yield ratios  among  crops  can be
taken as the appropriate measure of compar-
ative  advantage.  This  is  consistent  with  the
H-O theory. As a matter of fact, unlike capital,
land  is  a  nonneutral  input  in crop  growing.
Differences  in climate,  topography,  and  soils
result in deviations in the relative productivity
of land in growing different  crops. These dif-
ferences  may be viewed  as different  resource
endowments  in  crop  production.  When  the
yield differential is taken as the empirical mea-
sure of the relative  productivity  of land,  the
existing  skills of farmers are implicitly  incor-
porated into the measure of comparative  ad-
vantage  (human  resources).  However,  only
yield-increasing  human  resources  are includ-
ed,  and this approach does not capture  other
aspects of human resources.
The  composition  of trade  flows  has  often
been used in past studies as a measure of spe-
cialization.  The composition of total output is
parallel to that of trade  flows  in this  respect.
However,  in agriculture  the actual  output or
the composition  of trade  may not be  the ap-
propriate  measure  of specialization.  Due  to
fluctuations  in  weather  and  other  uncertain
Table  1.  World  Bank Measures  of Compar-




Groundnuts  .16  .23
Sesame  -.17  .33
Rapeseed  .22  .43
Cotton  .19  .42
Jute  .46  .45
Sugar cane  -.02  .54
Tobacco  .48  .15
Source:  World  Bank 1985b, p.  134.
factors,  actual  output  differs  from  that  ex-
pected or anticipated,  and the latter is what is
actually reflective of  the observed comparative
advantage.  The expected output is proportion-
al  to actual  sown  area;  in  fact,  the  expected
output is the product of the actual sown area
and the expected yield.  Therefore,  the sown-
area ratio,  rather  than output  or trade  com-
position, may best indicate the intended degree
of specialization  and  trade. According  to the
theory, the sown-area  ratio of different  crops
can be explained  by the expected  yield ratio.
If output prices change over time or vary among
regions, the sown-area ratio will be determined
by the return ratio, which is the product of the
yield ratio and the price ratio.
A major  difficulty  in testing  the theory  of
comparative advantage in Chinese agriculture
is the  existence  of the  government's  quanti-
tative  control  over both  the sown  areas  and
the deliveries  of major  farm products  to the
state.  If this government  control is  complete
and does not take into consideration  compar-
ative advantage,  the sown-area  ratio may not
have any relationship with the yield or return
ratio. However, if we can identify a period in
which peasants in some provinces had relative
freedom in making decisions in this regard, it
is  possible  to  conduct  empirical  tests of the
peasants'  behavior.
China's Grain and Cotton Production
Grain and cotton are two major crops in Chi-
na.2 The sown areas of the two crops together
2 In China's official statistics, "grain"  includes rice, wheat, corn,
soybeans,  sorghum, millet, potatoes, and other coarse grains. Cot-
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account  for about  85%  of the  total  national
acreage. Both grain and cotton have been sub-
ject to delivery  quotas since  the  early  1950s.
Before  1979, compulsory sown-area plans were
imposed  to ensure that  delivery  quotas were
met because  the  quota  prices  were  not high
enough to stimulate the desired  output.  As a
result, peasants  had no choice in land alloca-
tion. Following the economic reforms initiated
in  1979,  sown-area  plans  were  abolished  in
favor of more  local autonomy  and improved
economic  efficiency.  Grain  and  cotton  pur-
chasing  prices  were  raised by  a large margin
(20% alone for grain in 1979). As a result, out-
put of both  grain  and  cotton  increased  very
quickly in the early  1980s. At the same time,
delivery quotas were reduced and a larger por-
tion of the total delivery  was  purchased at  a
higher above-quota price. Because the pressure
on the above-quota deliveries  was not as great
as that on quota deliveries,  peasants who de-
livered  above-quota  quantities  of grain  and
cotton were relatively free to make their  own
decisions regarding land allocation between the
two crops. It is quite reasonable to assume that
their actions would have responded to the pro-
ductivity differential of their land.
It is also  true that China's  farmers are still
not free to make decisions as they remain sub-
ject to procurement and "contracted purchas-
ing" of quotas.  However,  they have obtained
a significant  degree  of autonomy  since  1979.
Prior to  the  reforms,  there  were  mandatory
"sown-area plans" in addition to procurement
quotas.  Farmers  had  virtually  no  decision-
making authority, because they were forced to
follow the acreage  plans even if they expected
to make above-quota deliveries of grain and/
or cotton  to the state.  Since  1979  they  have
only  been  subject  to  procurement  on  "con-
tracted purchasing"  quotas.3 Under this poli-
cy, if they can produce more grain and/or cot-
ton than called for under quota requirements,
they are relatively  free to make  decisions  re-
garding land allocation.
ton is considered an "industrial" crop. Additional industrial crops
include peanuts, rapeseed, sesame, sugar, jute, hemp, tobacco, etc.
The area sown in cotton is normally about one-fourth to one-third
of the total industrial crop sown  area.
3 The quota procurement  scheme was amended at the beginning
of the  1985 crop year.  The government introduced  a new "con-
tracting"  arrangement  for  state  grain  purchases  in place  of the
procurement quota system. In principle, the new system gave farm-
ers more freedom to decide how much grain (or cotton)  to sell to
the state.  In practice, the state continued to maintain control, and
the new system does not differ significantly  from the  1979 system
it replaced  (Tuan).
The size of the grain quotas has been reduced
several  times,  hence  the  farmer's  autonomy
has increased.  In 1984 the above-quota deliv-
ery of grain was  about  70% of the total pro-
curement for the whole country. This ratio was
reflected in the lower  1985  "contract"  price.
Although  the  above-quota  delivery  of grain
was encouraged and even required by the state,
the  quantities  were  much  less  restrictive.
Therefore,  the ratio of 70:30  provides  an in-
dication that farmers attained some degree of
autonomy after  1979.
The  case  of cotton  is  somewhat  different.
The government was and still is the sole buyer
of cotton.  Farmers  in some  areas  are free  to
decide  on cotton  acreage,  but they  must  sell
surplus output to the state. Just because they
sell marketable  surplus to the state  does not
mean the state dictates  how many acres they
must sow to cotton. The entire textile industry
is supplied  by the  state  so there  is  really  no
free market for cotton. Cotton producers nor-
mally keep only a small quantity for their own
use (usually less than 5% of production).  Prior
to  1984,  the above-quota  delivery  price  was
used by the state when necessary to give farm-
ers an incentive to expand cotton production.
When the government  cut its cotton purchas-
ing plan by  about  25%  in  1985,  farmers  re-
duced production.  Technically,  they were  al-
lowed to  sell their  surplus production  in the
free  market,  but  actually  there  was  no  such
market.  According  to  Luo  Wenpin, 4 the  de-
crease  in  cotton  production  was  planned  in
order to reduce government  spending.
As mentioned above, regional specialization
in Chinese agriculture has not developed along
the lines  suggested by the theory  of compar-
ative  advantage.  Lardy provides  evidence  to
suggest there was some regional specialization
in Chinese agriculture from 1949 through  1957,
but this was limited to animal husbandry and
economic crops. The policy was abandoned in
1965  in favor of one which  stressed  regional
self-sufficiency in food grain production. As a
consequence,  meat and industrial crops could
only  be  produced  if there  were  surplus  re-
sources available (Lardy). The Chinese policy
of regional  self-sufficiency  was clearly in line
with  Mao's  objection  to  international  trade.
Mao argued that no province in China should
4 See page  76, China's  Agricultural Yearbook, 1986 (Ministry of
Agriculture, Animal Husbandry,  and Fisheries).
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be dependent  on other provinces  for its grain
supply (Lardy).
Provincial  self-sufficiency  objectives  re-
duced the extent of interprovincial grain ship-
ments in China.  Lardy's figures  showed total
provincial  grain  exports  declined  from  7-8
million metric tons (mmt) (or 4.5-5.5% of  pro-
duction)  in the  1950s  to  only  2-3  mmt (.8-
1.1%  of production)  in the late  1970s.  These
figures are  similar to Walker's.  He estimated
that interprovincial  grain exports were  about
10 mmt during most of the late 1950s and then
declined to about 2.5 mmt by  1978.
With the implementation  of the  1979  eco-
nomic  reforms,  it  was  expected  that  inter-
provincial grain shipments would  increase as
there was some relaxation of the self-sufficien-
cy policy. The World Bank estimated that in-
terprovincial grain transfers were about 22 mmt
in 1982.5 Of this, an estimated  17 mmt moved
by rail and  5 mmt by water.  The North and
Northeast regions imported rice and exported
wheat and corn.  Overall,  the northern part of
China is a grain  importer and  receives  grain
from all regions (World Bank 1985a). The East
and  South-Central  regions  are  net exporters,
while the West and Southwest regions are net
importers.
Table 2  shows the quantity of interprovin-
cial grain flows in the early  1980s. Figures are
shown for both shipments and receipts by gov-
ernment agencies. The difference between im-
ports  and  exports,  through the  state-planned
grain  marketing  scheme,  is representative  of
imports from abroad. According to these data,
the  quantity  of  total  interprovincial  grain
transfers  was  about  14  to  17  mmt per  year,
which is lower than that estimated by the World
Bank for  1982.  It is interesting  to note from
table 2 that interprovincial transfers under state
planning  did not increase  after the  1979  eco-
nomic reforms.  On the other hand,  interpro-
vincial  grain  transfers  outside  state  planning
increased from  1.9 mmt in  1980  to 5.1  mmt
in 1985. Therefore, if increased specialization
in grain production is the new trend, it is de-
veloping at a slow pace.  These data in table 2
5 The  interprovincial  data reported  by  Lardy  and  by  Walker
exclude grain imported  from overseas and then transshipped be-
tween provinces in China. Alternatively,  the World Bank data and
that shown in table 2 represent total interprovincial transfers and
thus  include grain imported  from overseas.  The sum of the two
export columns in table  2 is interprovincial  exports and is com-
parable  to the  Lardy and  Walker export  figures  from  an earlier
period.







Through State Planned  Negotiated
Purchases and Sales  Prices
Year  Imports  Exports  Exports
--........................  m illion m  etric tons -----------------------------
1980  12.4  1.9  1.9
1981  12.3  1.3  2.9
1982  13.7  1.4  3.1
1983  12.3  1.0  3.0
1984  12.4  1.6  4.5
1985  n/a  n/a  5.1
Source: China's State Statistics Bureau, Beijing, unpublished data.
Note:  State planned purchases and sales are  shipped through in-
terprovincial channels and are handled through the Chinese Min-
istry of Commerce. Exports are interprovincial exports sold to the
Ministry of Commerce by an individual province.  The difference
between provincial  exports  and imports represents  international
imports.
on interprovincial  shipments  appear  to con-
tradict the World Bank results in table  1. The
World  Bank results  implied  the existence  of
regional specialization  in Chinese  agriculture.
If this were the case, we would expect to see a
significant amount of interprovincial trade, but
this is not reflected in the data in table 2. This
conflicting evidence is a clear indication of the
need for further research on the topic of com-
parative  advantage in Chinese agriculture.
Regional  Comparative Advantage in
Chinese  Agriculture
In China the state is by far the largest buyer
of farm products, especially in the case of grain
and cotton. The purchase prices are set by the
state and thus the "small" country assumption
can be  applied to each province.  We  express
the comparative advantage of Chinese farmers
in terms of land productivity-the yield ratio
of different  crops. If price changes are consid-
ered, the return ratio of different  crops could
be used instead. If a province has a relatively
high  cotton/grain  yield  ratio compared  with
other provinces, the theory predicts it will tend
to specialize in cotton production and sell more
cotton to the state. This is the hypothesis  we
wish to test.
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Table 3.  Ratios of Cotton/Grain Sown  Areas and Yields
Prov-
ince  Ratios  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Jiangsu  Yield  .229  .178  .216  .190  .207  .181  .167  .157  .161  -
Area  - .099  .104  .106  .105  .110  .092  .075  .084  .094
Henan  Yield  .153  .266  .216  .175  .254  .233  .225  .238  .252
Area  - .071  .071  .084  .085  .129  .090  .066  .077  .101
Hubei  Yield  .241  .185  .184  .156  .184  .263  .246  .235  .226  -
Area  - .111  .112  .109  .106  .102  .091  .081  .084  .089
Anhui  Yield  .126  .155  .159  .150  .180  .196  .192  .203  .209  -
Area  - .054  .055  .054  .053  .054  .040  .034  .036  .044
Source:  Calculated from China's  Agricultural Yearbook,  1980-88.
The  ratio of sown  areas of cotton  to grain
will  be  taken  as  the appropriate  measure  of
specialization.  In China there is a further rea-
son  not  to  expect  complete  provincial  spe-
cialization in crops other than grain. Given the
constraints on transportation  and the politics
between  the  central  and  provincial  govern-
ments, each province is supposed to attain self-
sufficiency  if at all feasible.  Hence  grain pro-
duction is dominant through all regions of Chi-
na.
We  selected  grain  and cotton  for two  rea-
sons.  First,  they  are  the two  major crops  in
China. Second, in the past they have also been
major imports, and hence the production and
sale of the two crops have been encouraged by
the state.  Of the 29 provinces in China, there
are only  nine provinces  where the area sown
to cotton exceeds  3%  of the total area.  How-
ever,  five  of  these  nine  provinces,  Hebei,
Shanxi,  Shandong,  Shaanxi,  and  Xinjian im-
ported grain  during the period  studied  here.
As each province is required to make an effort
to  achieve  grain  self-sufficiency,6 these  five
provinces were not in a position to freely make
decisions  regarding  the  allocation  of  land
among  nongrain  crops.  Therefore,  we  chose
the remaining four  provinces of Jiangsu, He-
nan, Hubei, and Anhui for more careful study.
These four provinces are all grain exporters. It
is reasonable  to assume that these four prov-
inces are relatively free to make decisions con-
cerning the areas sown to grain versus cotton
given the relative  land productivity,  which  is
expressed in terms of  their yield ratio (or return
ratio). As the four provinces  differ in size, the
6  See "Grain  Importing  Provinces  Symposium on  Grain  Pro-
duction"  in China's Statistical Yearbook,  1983,  p.  315  (China's
State Statistics Bureau).
ratio of sown  area of cotton  to grain will  be
used  to  measure  the  relative  degree  of spe-
cialization. Our working hypothesis is that the
ratio of sown areas of cotton to grain is deter-
mined by the expected ratio of yields. The ac-
tual yield ratio in the previous year is taken as
the proxy for the expected value.
Empirical Analysis
The  period  chosen  was  1979-88  because  of
data availability and because it marks the dra-
matic change in government policy which took
place in 1979. Before then direct planning was
used to control the sown areas of major crops,
and  farmers  were  unable  to  respond  to  the
comparative advantage embodied in land pro-
ductivity.  The introduction of the Production
Responsibility System in 1979 has given farm-
ers much  more freedom  to make production
decisions.
Based on the sown area and yield (per sown
hectare) ratios shown in table  3, two methods
are used to test the hypothesis of  production ac-
cording to  comparative  advantage.  The  first
method  is  the  rank  correlation  test and  the
second uses  linear regression.  The Spearman
rank  correlation  coefficient  (Koutsoyiannis),
r', is  a  measurement  of the relationship  be-
tween  two  variables,  based  on  the  observa-
tions' ranks rather than on their numerical val-
ues.  The  value of r' varies between  -1  to  1.
A value  of 1 means  perfect positive  correla-
tion,  -1,  perfect  negative correlation,  and 0,
no correlation  at all.
This  measurement  is justified  on  the  as-
sumption  that if a province  has  a relatively
high cotton/grain yield ratio in one  year, it is
likely to have a relatively high expectation  of
that ratio and hence a relatively high cotton/
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Table 4.  Ranks of Cotton/Grain Sown  Areas  and Yields
Province  Ranks  1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988
Jiangsu  Yield  2  3  1  1  2  4  4  4  4  -
Area  - 2  2  2  2  2  1  2  1  2
Henan  Yield  3  1  2  2  1  2  2  1  1  -
Area  - 3  3  3  3  1  3  3  3  1
Hubei  Yield  1  2  3  3  3  1  1  2  2  -
Area  - 1  1  1  1  3  2  1  2  3
Anhui  Yield  4  4  4  4  4  3  3  3  3  -
Area  - 4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4  4
Source:  Calculated from China's  Agricultural  Yearbook,  1980-88.
grain sown area in the following year. The cor-
responding ranks of yield ratio and sown-area
ratio are likely to move in the same direction.
The rank correlation statistic has some advan-
tages over the linear correlation coefficient be-
cause  it involves  less  restrictive assumptions
on the data, and we are measuring the expected
yield ratio which in some ways is a qualitative
variable. The expectation is for either a "high"
or "low"  relative yield, and  acreage will  shift
from grain to cotton where and when the ex-
pectation  is for a relatively high cotton yield.
The ranks of the area and yield ratios of each
province in each year are computed from the
data in table  3 and are listed in table  4.  The
rank correlation coefficient is given by the for-
mula shown below.
During  1979-84, the rank correlation  coef-
ficients  were positive as expected.  They were
very high,  1, in two years  and relatively low,
.4, in three years. The average value was .6 for
the first five years (i.e.,  1979-84). Perfect pos-
itive correlation every year is not likely to exist
for  several  reasons.  Besides  random  distur-
bances, regional disparity in land productivity
within  a province,  different  cost  ratios,  and
lagged processes  are all relevant  factors influ-
encing production  decisions.  The ratio of ex-
pected yields is only one factor affecting changes
in the ratio of sown  areas.  From  1984/85  to
1987/88, only two out of four rank correlation
coefficients  were of the expected sign, and the
average  was  close to zero. There  was a major
policy change which affected cotton acreage in
1984/85 which led to the negative coefficients.
The overall  1979-88 average rank correlation
coefficient  was .4, which is of the correct sign
but  statistically  insignificant  from  zero.  The
critical  r' is  .5  at  a  significance  level of .10
(Conover).
Although the statistical results are weak (es-
pecially for the latter part of the period), these
results suggest that if a province has relatively
high land  productivity in cotton  production,
it is likely that it will  devote  more farmland
to cotton production. Since all provinces face
approximately  the same prices each  year, the
return ratio will provide the same ranks to each
province as does the yield ratio. It is therefore
unnecessary  to consider the price  changes in
calculating the rank correlation  coefficients.
A further  test of regional  comparative  ad-
vantage is based on linear regressions. The an-
nual  percentage  change  in the ratio  of sown
area  is used  as the dependent  variable  upon
which  are regressed the  percentage  change in
lagged  yield ratios.  A pooled time-series  and
cross-sectional model is used to maximize the
6 2  D2
n(n
2 - 1)'
where D is the difference between the two corresponding  ranks, and n is the number of obser-
vations.
The estimated rank correlation  coefficients are as follows:
Year  79/80  80/81  81/82  82/83  83/84  84/85  85/86  86/87  87/88
r'  1.0  0.4  0.4  0.4  1.0  -0.2  0.4  -0.4  0.4
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degrees of freedom. The first regression model
is:
(1)  A  = a, + a2D2 + a 3D3
+ a4D4 + bYj_  + ej,
where Aj is the estimated percent change ratio
of cotton to grain sown area in the ith province
and  the jth  year;  Yij_  is  the  actual  percent
change  in the ratio of cotton to grain yield  in
the ith province and the j-1  th year;7 and Di
is a dummy variable,  which equals one for the
ith province and zero for the other provinces.
The random disturbance term is ei.  The prov-
inces are considered in the same order as shown
in table 3, and the dummy variable for Jiangsu
province  is left out of the regression.
Using the  1979-88 data in table  3, the OLS
results  are as  follows:
(2)  Ai  = .008-  .017D 2 - .018D3
(.13)  (-.19)  (-.21)
- .084D4 +  .338 Yij
(-.97)  (2.21)
F= 1.53  R 2 = .17  DW=  1.66
The figures in parentheses are t-ratios.
The estimated coefficient associated with the
yield variable is significant at the 5% level and
this is of interest. This statistical result is not
only stronger than that obtained from the rank
correlation  coefficient but also  shows the nu-
merical relationship between the area and yield
ratios. It  can be  expected that, on average,  if
the yield ratio of cotton to grain in a province
increased by 1%, the sown area would increase
by .338% in that province in the following year.
The  insignificant  coefficients  of the  dummy
variables  indicate  that  the  intercept  of  the
function does not vary from province to prov-
ince.
Therefore,  it  may  be  concluded  that  if a
province has a relatively higher yield ratio of
cotton to grain, it is also likely to have a rel-
atively higher sown-area ratio of cotton to grain.
If a province's cotton yield increases faster than
its  grain  yield,  it is  likely that its  sown-area
ratio of cotton to grain will increase over time.
Taking price  changes  into consideration,  a
similar regression model is estimated in which
the independent  variable  is the  return ratio,
7 As an alternative to using a one-year lagged change in yield as
an explanatory  variable  in equation  (1),  we  tried using a  lagged
two-year moving-average  change in yield. However, the statistical
results were not as good as reported in equation  (2).
rather than the yield ratio. The percent change
in the  return  ratio,  R,  is  the  product  of the
yield ratio and price  ratio.  The price  ratio  is
the  average  price  received  and  reported  in
China's Statistical Yearbook  (China's  State
Statistics  Bureau).  This  model gives  the fol-
lowing results  with 1979-88  data:
(3)  A i=  .01  - .018D 2 - .022D3
(.17)  (-.20)  (-.25)
- .087D4 + .289Rij
(-.99)  (1.99)
F=  1.28  R 2= .15  DW =  1.72
where Rij_  is the annual percent change in the
cotton-to-grain return ratio in the ith province
and j-  th year, and where all other variables
have the meanings  stated previously.
This  model indicates  that when  prices  are
changing  over time, the  comparative  advan-
tage of a province in cotton or grain production
can be expressed  in terms of the return ratio.
With  this  model,  both  the  relative  physical
productivity of land and the relative prices will
determine  a  province's  comparative  advan-
tage over time.  The changes in relative yields
and the changes in relative prices are both im-
portant in allowing each province to make de-
cisions regarding the allocation of its fixed ar-
able land between cotton and grain production.
As the return  here  is the  product of yield
and price, it does not take into consideration
the different  costs  among provinces  and the
different  prices for different  grain  crops.  Be-
cause of data restrictions, net returns could not
be used  as an indicator of land productivity.
If the data  on  cost structures  and  prices  for
different  grains  become  available  in  the  fu-
ture, a more precise  study would be possible.
The Cotton Purchasing Policy  and the
Implications  for Sown  Area
During the  1979-84 period, the Chinese  gov-
ernment  lifted  direct  controls  on  crop  sown
area  and  used  price  incentives  to  encourage
both cotton and grain production. The relative
price was in favor of cotton and its sown area,
and output increased much faster than that for
grain. In the five-year period, the cotton sown
area increased by 53.4% and output by 183.6%,
compared  with a 5.4% decrease  in grain area
sown  and  a  22.6%  increase  in grain  output.
The increase in cotton sown area varied from
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province  to  province:  22.5%  for  Jiangsu,
109.4%  for  Henan,  -6.8%  for  Hubei,  and
11.6%  for Anhui.  This indicates  that  cotton
producers responded not only to the more fa-
vorable price but also to their own compara-
tive advantage.
As consumption and exports of cotton prod-
ucts  experienced  only  moderate  growth,  the
Chinese  government  acquired  large  cotton
stocks during this period. These stocks not only
enabled  China  to  cut its  cotton  imports  by
84.5% in 1984 over 1983, but also forced Chi-
na to reduce domestic cotton production sub-
stantially.
For  political  reasons  the  Chinese  govern-
ment could not reduce the cotton purchasing
price in order to discourage cotton production.
Instead,  it cut cotton procurement  quantities
through  reducing  "contracted"  purchasing
quotas. As there were no other market outlets
available,  Chinese farmers had to reduce their
cotton sown area in accordance with the quota.
The data show that decreases in cotton  sown
area in 1985 over  1984 were 17.9% in Jiangsu,
13.8% in Henan,  31.7% in Hubei,  and  19.6%
in Anhui.
It  is reasonable  to expect  that had  the  re-
duced  acreage  been  encouraged  by  price
changes,  farmers  would  have  responded  ac-
cording to their comparative advantage as they
did when prices increased. It is also reasonable
to assume that either price changes or selective
purchasing  quotas  could have resulted  in the
same total acreage levels. These selective quo-
tas  could be  implemented  if the government
wished to maximize social welfare through ex-
ploitation  of provincial  comparative  advan-
tage.
However,  when  1984/85  through  1987/88
data are  applied to  the rank correlation test,
the estimated  coefficients  turn out to be  low
or negative, indicating low correlation between
the yield ratio and  the sown-area  ratio.  This
result suggests that when the Chinese govern-
ment  imposed  the  lower  cotton  purchasing
quotas in  1985,  regional comparative  advan-
tage was not used as a major criterion.
Summary
In this article land productivity was suggested
as a measure of comparative advantage in Chi-
nese agriculture.  Provincial data were  used to
test the well-known hypothesis that regions will
tend to  specialize  in  the  production  of that
commodity where comparative advantage lies.
The empirical results indicate that the level of
Chinese regional  specialization  in cotton and
grain responded according to comparative ad-
vantage  during  the  1979-84  period  when
farmers  were given the freedom  to make  de-
cisions.  However,  for  cotton  there  was  a
marked departure in 1985 when all of  a sudden
farmers had less freedom to make production
decisions. These results suggest the basic prin-
ciple of comparative advantage could take hold
and lead to regional specialization  in Chinese
agriculture because farmers will respond if they
are given the opportunity.  However,  if China
is to realize gains from increased regional spe-
cialization and trade, additional investment in
infrastructure,  particularly  in  transportation,
will be required.
[Received December 1989; final revision
received May 1991.]
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